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A R IS T O T L E

0 1ST W OM EN

It is notorious th at Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries SC combined pride
in its democratic institutions with slave ownership and male dominance. In
general, these latter institutions were matter neither for pride nor for apology.
They were taken for granted. Both were indeed ubiquitous in the world the
Athenians knew.
It is also notorious th at Aristotle was an apologist of both slavery and
male supremacy. Since he 'is a key figure in the history of philosophy, and
something of a father figure for Thcmists, his supposed beliefs have proved-useful
for consciousness-raising. In recent decades of civil-rights agitation over the
treatment of Blacks, slavery was the hot theme; more lately that has fallen into
a condition of benign neglect, and the status of women has been more popular.
In neither case has precision in the presentation of Aristotle’s benighted views
been either sought or obtained. In the case of. slavery, the facts are quite easy
to check. In the case of woman, they are not; available scholarship not only
misinterprets but mis-states essential points. The following inquiry was prompted
by awareness th at accepted positions did not account for ail the data. It was
expected th a t a survey would uncover a number of incompatible theses from
different contexts. But a check of passages thrown up by Bonitz’s index suggested
that, on the contrary, Aristotle has a consistent view which is not quite what
is generally supposed, though th at view has difficulties which, ha does not
confront.
The aim of this paper is not to vindicate Aristotle. His opinions may be
thought of as a set of mutually reinforcing fictions, and their general tendency
may in fact be more offensive to contemporary enlightened thought than the
positions usually ascribed to him. The aim is to give an account of what those
positions may be taken, on a reasonable interpretation of his surviving words,
to have been.
In understanding such issues, it is essential· to bear constantly in mind
Aristotle’s fundamental approach, based on his world view—even people who know
these very wall keep forgetting about them. Aristotle’s world is a world without
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.beginning or end, a steady-state world in which man is a part of nature. Human
institutions, though interrupted by catastrophes, are part of an unchanging
natural order. The world makes no progress, has no history. Human beings do
not, therefore, have to discover or invent their humanity; traditional views must
be basically correct, and widespread institutions such as piracy, slavery, and
patriarchy, must be fundamentally right,i But only fundamentally right. Aristotle
almost always subverts traditions, showing that existing beliefs and practices
•are perverse variations on what is right. His work is thus a curious combination
of convservatism and radicalism. It is characteristic that his ethics combines
an underwriting of traditcnai moral values with radical claims for the
intellectual life th a t are based on a re-thinking of the basis of that morality
itself. This means that we have to read carefully. We make mistakes if we misread
his qualified endorsements. It is all too easy to slip into the assumption that
he is endorsing the popular errors th at ha is correcting by subverting them
from within. Matters are not helped by the fact that the upshot is not always
clear, and th a t when the upshot is clear we cannot always sea Aristotle’s
justification for drawing the line between basic truth and superficial perversion
just where ha does.
In the case of slavery, the pitfalls are familiar. Aristotle is often quoted
as (i) justifying slavery, (ii) justifying the Greek policy of enslaving
"barbarians”, and üii) saying th at a slave is not a human being but a "living
tool”. But most of the people who write oh this topic really know th a t none
of these true statements is true in what seems to be its obvious sense. First,
slavery is a justifiable institution only because there is a difference between
the ability to formulate a policy and the ability to follow instructions^ Someone
who has the la tte r ability without the former is a "natural slave”, needing
someone with the former ability to provide the plans, and benefiting from that
condition. It is justifiable to make such a person a slave even by force, since
ex hypothesi the natural slave has no grounds for approving or disapproving
any action or policy. But it is only such people whose enslavement can be justified,
and the argument does not show th at there are any such paople.3 And in any
case, in real life the people who are slaves are those who happen to have been
enslaved. And th a t practice is net justified. Aristotle does not approve but
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condemns the practice of slave-taking and slave-keeping as it existed in his
society— or in any other, for that matter. If Aristotle is a champion of slavery,
it is of a farm of slavery that never existed.^
Second, Aristotle says th a t if there are whole nations of natural masters
and other nations of natural slaves, slave wars are justified. This, he says, is
what explains the claim by the Greek poets th a t "Greeks should not enslave
Greeks”— they think Greeks should enslave barbarians, who are natural slaves
LPotiÉics 1252b 6-9). But the fact that the thesis in question underlies and explains
the poets’ claim does not justify the claim, nor does Aristotle say it dass; the
statement remains hypothetical.®
Third, it is quite true th at a slave, as such, is an obedient instrument.
That is how the condition of slavery as such is defined. But a slave is also
a human being, and one can relate to a slave as to a human being. And it is
not even true th a t a slave is a "living tool” in arty sense th a t would permit
substitution of inanimate tools: slaves cooperate in the living of our lives <o
μβν γκρ Sauhoç κοχνωνος ζωής, PoUéics Í260a 39; cf. 1253b 33 - Í254a 3).
The result of all this is that unqualified statements about Aristotle’s views
on master/slave relations tend to be misleading, Aristotle says in so many words
th a t the word "slave” is radically ambiguous-—δτχως· γ*ρ hsjertxx τ ο Souheúeiv
κ<χ\ ο SoGhoç (i255a4-5). The implications of a statement about such relations
depend on whether the subject is the relations between natural slaves and natural
masters, or between de facto slaves and da facto masters; and on whether one
is talking about their relationship qua master and slave, or qua human beings—
and so on.. And matters are further complicated by that famous pitfall for novices,
the need to distinguish between what Aristotle asserts and what ha accepts as
being the prevailing view (δοκεΐ).
We do have to be careful. .For instance, Aristotle says th at the status
(τ ά ξ ις — the word refers precisely to civil status and not, for instance, to how
people are treated or esteemed) of women and slaves (though different elsewhere)
is the same in nations in which all are slaves. But the context makes it plain
th a t ha is not talking about "nations of natural slaves” here, but about nations
which are under despotic rule so th at the status of all but the ruler is that
of slave, and a woman can only be the slave of a slave,-
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Aristçtle deals with relations between men and women in two distinct
contexts. In the Ethics the context is that of personal bonding and parenthood
(Íi6'ibió-iíó2a34); in the Politics the context is economic, and master/slava
relations are taken up at the same time. The la tte r passage is generally
misunderstood nowadays because its readers come from urban backgrounds and
read it as if it were concerned with apartment-dwellers in a cash economy. It
is not. It deals with the family as opposed to the city, but its subject is the
oÍk-ioc, the homestead: in effect, the family farm. The homestead is said to be
ττροτβρον kcct «ναγκβηότβρον than the city XEIf iiQ2aiS) which, though natural,
is a product of political activity. Fart of the significance of the homestead is
th a t the prototypes of the basic political relationships (monarchy, oligarchy,
timocracy, democracy, tyranny) are found in it and based on it. But the homestead
is in itself fundamental and ineradicable, because it is the condition of human
existence: it is the locus of food supply and generation, the basis of human
survival (cf. De Anima 3 4i5a23-26). The homestead as thus conceived is an
independent social and economic unit. According to the key passage in Politics
I, there are within this unit three relationships: man/wife, master/slava, parent/
child. Since the homestead is a policy-making and policy-following entity, its
members, as they enter into its constitutive relations, are differentiated by the
way their policy-making ("deliberative”) function operates. In the slave, it is
not operative: the slave as such has no say in how the farm is run. In the child,
it has not developed yet, is not yet operative: the child will help run the place
on maturity. In the wife, it is complete but «κνρον» no^ *n οοη^Γ°1· That leaves
the patriarch to make the decisions.
The main question for this paper is what «κυρον means here. In what sense
is the wife’s deliberative faculty "not in control”? The prevailing view,
represented by W, W. Fortanbaugh,? is th a t it is not in control because women
are ruled by their emotions. My claim is that this is quite wrong, for four reasons.
First, no Aristotelian text supports the view th a t woman are ruled by their
emotions. Second, several texts tell against it. Third, the immediate context (as
my paraphrase was meant to suggest) contradicts.it. And fourth, that is not
how Aristotle uses the word «κυρον elsewhere.
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On the first paint, all one can say is that supporting quotations are always
from other authors, not all of them Greek. One eminent scholar <whom I do not
name because it was in an unpublished paper) cited La Donna e mobile—-an
irrelevance significant as indicating how carelessly people assume, that this must
be what Aristotle means, because the stereotype is so familiar. But I suggested
above that one must be careful, in reading Aristotle, to distinguish between what
he is saving and what ha is rejecting in subverting traditions from within.
The second point is easier to support. In the Ethics, Aristotle says that
children and animals cannot have βύδοημονία, and th a t young.people cannot
profitably study ethics, because they cannot frame and follow policies
<iQ99b32-iiQ0a4, Iû95a2-i2). He does not say th a t women cannot be happy. So
presumably they can; the argument from silence is conclusive here. Again, in EN
VIII, he says of human pair-bonding that women and men come together for sex
and stay together <a) because of the children, <b) to divide the chores, the
partners having their own spheres of responsibility, and <c> "because of virtue”,
out of mutual liking and respect <iiá2ai9-29), Nothing is said of any supposed
dependence or incapacity of the female; cn the contrary, each is a responsible
contributor to the partnership: eôôùç τ*Ρ δ^ηρητοα rot spyoc» icon ewrtv '¿ts poc
«νδρσς· icon •j'uvonicôç* «τπχρκσΟσχν αυγ àhhqhoiç· eîç το κοινσν rxdévreç τ*
vÖtoc (ii62a22-4). And again, in Politics II, where he objects to Plato’s rejection
of sexual differentiation among the Guardians in the Republic, ha does not do
so on the basis of female incapacity for government. His objection is rather
to the use of analogies from brute beasts in an area where cultural arrangements
are decisive: qctottov oè κοη to βκ των θηρίων ττοιβίσθοη την nocpocßohqv, orx
δβΐ τσί ocÚtoc βτητηδβυβιν tocç· γυνοηκικς· τοίς- οτνδράστν, οΤς- οτκσνσμίοο^ ονδεν
μετεσττν <1264b4-6). If th a t means anything, it means that the objection is· not
th a t Plato defies psychology but th at he ignores the requirements of division
of .labour in the homestead.
The third and fourth paints, dealing with the context and with Aristotle’s
use of ôcKupov, will be taken up later.
The foregoing suggests th at the difference in authority between man and
women in the household depends on the functions they fulfil in the household.
But then, why should those functions call fcr the female to play the subordinate
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part? SJe are prepared to find that Aristotle does think women inherently inferior
to men. And so he does—in some respects^. 3ut we recall Aristotle’s insistence
th a t terms like "equal” and "unequal” are not to be used absolutely: one must
say in what respect the alleged equality obtains, and make sure that the equality
is relevant to the practical issue to be decided tcf. Politics III, 128Ga ÍQ-25),
In what precise respect doss Aristotle say that women are inferior to men?
People often say th a t the inferiority is physiological; but this is misleading,
because it sounds as if women were organically defective (e.g. because lacking
a penis).? The inferiority Aristotle speaks of is indeed inferiority of the body,
but it is a matter of chemistry. The essential difference between male and female
lies in what they contribute to the offspring they generate: it is the difference
between the female’s blood, which provides the matter, and the male’s seminal
fluid, which provides the form.i-0 The seminal fluid is blood that has gone through
a further process οΐ··π4ρχς, or cooking— A ristotle’s all-purpose word for the
processes of metabolism (Gen. An. IV, ?65biQ). This sexual differentiation in
reproduction is found in all well-developed species of living things. But why?
Aristotle gives one of his annoying non-answers: because it is better to have ·
the matter-supplier and the form-bearer separata (7^20).^As to why it is better,
we are given no hint; perhaps we should supply one from the remark in the
Politics about why wife and slave should not be the same in the household: nature
generally uses different things for different purposes (1252b i-5). But once the
differentiation is allowed, everything else follows. The child has to grow where
the matter is, in the mother and later with the mother. All physiological
differences between the saxes either result from this fact or follow directly from
the male being better cooked. In neither case are they unequivocal superiorities,
and in the farmer case it is inappropriate to speak of "better” or "worse” at
all, since the differences are functional. In most animal species, the female is
larger, slower, softer; the mala is smaller, more active, more aggressive, and
tougher in the sense th at it is more likely to have large horns, tusks and other
hard bits (Part. An. 6óíb32). The same chemical difference that makes the female
the matter-supplier makes it less mobile and hence more apt to stick around
with the young ones; so everything fits.
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It is obvious from this th at females are not going to be flightier or more
emotional than males. We might rather expect the opposite. But Aristotle does
not say th a t either. What he does say is th a t in most species there are typical
differences in temperament between the sexes; that these tend to follow a common
pattern; and th at these become more marked to the extent that a species has
ήθος·» th a t is» character tra its or personality. It follows th a t the typical
differences between male and female will be more clearly marked in humans than
in any other species.
'
Aristotle’s description of the differences in question is indeed male-oriented
in the precise sense th at women are described by their differences from men
and men are not described at all. But the differences are not in the direction
of greater flightiness.

,

Woman is more compassionate than man» more easily moved to
tears, . . . more jealous, more querulous, more apt to scold and
to strike. The female is also more despondent and despairing
than the male, more shameless and more given to falsehood, more
easily deceived and of more retentive memory. She is also more
wakeful and more shrinking. And in general the female is less
quick to taka action than the male and needs less food (Hist.
An. IZ.Í, 603b 8- 15).*2
Man are mobile, aggressive, tough, simple-minded and hard to teach; woman are
passive, tender, devious-minded and easier to teach.
The Historia Animalium is a descriptive work, and no attempt is made to
derive these stereotypes from the initial chemical difference and the physiological
and functional differentiations th a t follow from that. But as we look at the
alleged differences we may reflect that, nof only do they fail to add up to males
being more governed by reason than females, but they do not add up to males
being better than females in any clear sense. Males are not so much batter as
bossier, and Aristotla says just that. The word ha uses is ήγεμον^κώτερον (Pol.
1259b2).
Does Aristotla not say, then, th a t women are inferior to men? Yes, but
his statements are more nuanced than-is sometimes supposed. Consider, for
instance, his most notorious statement, that a woman is in a sense a "monster”
(τέρας·) (Gsn. An. 767b5). It turns out that the point of this is to say why woman
are not monsters. A woman is a monster in ju st the same sense as a child that
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resembles neither of its parents: it is a departure from type—but -not, we may
infer from the analogy, in human terms defective. Mhereas a monstrous birth,
in the literal sense, is a product of accidental necessity, a mere failure of the
form to realise itself, female births are a natural necessity— if there are to
be human beings, somebody has to be mother. So the cooking process has to be
incomplete in half the species. The inferiority is metaphysical: the reason for
not simply saying that males and females differ in the amount of cooking (without
implying th a t either amount is better than the other) is that form is inherently
better than matter and th at cooking is form-giving; and th a t to be a formbearer is "more divine” than to be a matter-supplier.
Beyond that, however, is the clear implication th a t it is better to be
dominant than to be submissive, better to be active than to be passive. The
activity of the mala in generation (729a25-35) is part of the general fact that,
as we have seen, males are physically more active than females (it is because
males move around and injure themselves in the womb that more malas ara born
defective than females, Gen. An. IV, 775a8>. Mhen males are said to be superior
to females, the word used is κρείττων» as opposed to χςίρων; not ßshrvuv or
άμετνων. But this is a word with a very distinctive flavour. lt does not always
connote superiority in the sense of bettarness at all. Mhen Thrasymachus in
Republic I defines justice as το του κρενττονσς ξυμψερσν, the whale point is
th a t the stronger are not better in anything other than their superior power,
and no one has yet translated that phrase as "the interest of the better.” When
the word does connate a more general superiority, as whan voGç is called
κράτϊοτον in Metaphysics Λ 7, or as when one man’s work is said, to be κρείττον
than another’s at ES U33ai3, there is often a sense of overreaching or holding
sway. LSJ sums up the tendency of the word’s most venerable uses as "stronger,
braver, superior in rank”, with its converse χενρων as "inferior in bodily
strength or courage or in rank.” And now'when we look at the one flat assertion
of male superiority in Politics I, we can appreciate the nuances: ετ\ δε to «ρρεν
irpoç το 8η?»υ φυσετ το μεν κρείττον το δε χείρον, κοά το μεν «ρχον το δ’
άρχόμβνον (1254bi3). The context is th at of dominance. To use such a word in
Aristotle’s world (or in ours) is already to endorse male values. And yet, when
discussing the virtues of men and women in Politics I, Aristotle observes strict
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parity. (Whan issues of superiority and inferiority are mooted, he speaks of "the
male” and "the female”; hut he speaks of the virtues of "men” and of "women.”)
The statement th at the σωφροσύνη of a man would be pushiness in a woman
is balanced by the statement· th at the «νδρβία of a woman would ba cowardice
in a man.*3 The complamantarinass of function in the homestead is matched by
a complementariness of virtues. And this is very important, for to be better
is simply to excel in virtue. To say th a t men are better than women is to say
th a t they excel women in human virtues. Aristotle is careful not to say that,
and what he does say.rules it out. One has only to realise th a t σωφροσύνη,
no less than ocvSpeioc, is discussed in the Ethics as. one af the human virtues,
and th a t to better than someone or something else is necessarily tc excel in
some virtue, to realise that Aristotle has ruled out of court the possibility that
women as such should be inferior to men as such.
The functions of husband and wife in the homestead are different. The
man acquires, the woman preserves, as suits the mobility of the mala and the
immobility of the female. It would be lunatic to say that one of these functions
was better than the other, and Aristotia' does not say it. What ha does say,
in Politics III, is that the differentiation of function explains the differentiation
of appropriate excellence or "virtue” mentioned in Book I: εττει καί οικονομία
ετβρα ocvSpôç καί tovotkoç· του μέν ·ρ«ρ κτδσθοο της· δε φυλκχττειν ερ-ρον
Ιστίν (1277b20-25).i4
We are now finally in a position to return to the context of the statement
in which Aristotle says th at the wife’s deliberative power is «κυρον. What we
find Aristotle actually saying there is exactly what we should by now be expecting
him to say— something entirely incompatible with the notion that women are
too emotional to be left to their own devices.
The relation of man and wife is political: th a t is, it is based on the
presumption of equality. Wife defers to husband not because of any innate
superiority but because his is the leader’s role. In typical political organisations,
people take turns to exercise this function; but, even there, the person whods
in office for the time being is treated as a superior, with respect and deferenceju st as the piece of gold th at used to be Amasis’s washpot is worshipped whan
it is made into a statue. That is the analogy Aristotle draws, and it makes no
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sense a t all unless men and tornen are, so far as their ability to run their lives
goes, equal. This is the immediate context of the statement th a t the wife’s
deliberative power is «κυρον, and commentators tend to ignore it.
But what does the word wcupov mean anyway? Aristotle elsewhere, if
Bonitz’s index can be relied on, invariably uses it in the same one of its several
meanings— a meaning th a t Fortenbaugh, for instance, does not mention. It is
the sense in which a superseded contract or an overruled ψηφχσμ« is «κυρον.
It is simply not operative. A contract th a t is «κυρον is not for th a t reason
a worse contract than the one th at is in effect. The idea that Aristotle holds
th a t women’s intellectual faculties are somehow either defective or. at the mercy
of their feelings in a way th a t is not true of men is mere moonshine. All he
is saying is th at, in the household, wives do not make the policy decisions but
defer to their husbands.
All this may still leave us wondering why men should be the decision-makers.
The fact th a t as males they are more active and bossier may suggest that they
are likely to taka the lead, but not necessarily that it is better that they should
do so. It is not obvious that acquirers are better decision-makers than preservers,
or th a t the temperamentally cautious, calm, and gentle female should not make
the decisions. Indeed, since the two make separate contributions to the economy,
it might seem reasonable for them to reach decisions jointly. In fact, this is
what Aristotle does say, in the passage where he deals most directly with the
issue.
The husband’s rule depends on his worth or merit, and the sphere
of his rule is th at which is proper to a man. Whatever is mere
suited to a woman he turns over to his wife. But whenever a
husband takes the authority over all matters into his hand,
he transforms the association into an oligarchy, since in doing
so he violates the principle of merit and does not rule by virtue
of his superiority. Sometimes the wife rules because she is an
heiress. But of course this kind of - rule is not in terms of
excellence or virtue, but is based on wealth and power, just as
in oligarchies {EN VIH, ii¿0b32-37).
But we note th at the division of powers comas about through delegation: the
husband hands over <«ττοδίδωσχν> certain matters to his wife. We are still left
wondering why the man has this authority. Is it because, as the acquisitive one,
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he is in contact with the world outside the walls and knows what must he done
to succeed in it? Conceivably; but I think the explanation lies elsewhere,
I think the situation envisaged is that described in Xenophon’s Economices.
The position is incorporated in the quasi-Aristotelian Economice I, and endorsed
in Politics VII; but it is the terms of Xenophon’s explanation that are addressed
most directly to our concerns here. The situation, clearly envisaged as normal,
is th a t of a 35-year-old man marrying a girl of fourteen. He teaches her how
to run the household, he says, because she has as yet had no chance to learn
anything, "What knowledge could she have had when I took her for my wife?
She was not yet fifteen years old!” iEcon IV, 4-6). But now th at she has been
taught, "In my house, my wife is quite capable of looking after things herself”
\K<xvrj διοτκεΐν, Econ. VII, 3); and the wife contributes as much to the
household as the husband does, because she controls expenditure as he controls
income (HI, 15),
It is clear enough th at if normal households are thus constituted the
husband will be the senior partner. But perhaps the disparity in ages is simply
a fact of Greek upper-class mores, arising precisely from the fact that the man
was expected to lead and provide, We need some independent reason for the
difference in ages; and Aristotle provides »one. The reason is hygienic. Ideally,
men should marry woman twenty years younger than themselves, because the
children of those who are too young or too old tend to be defective and weak:
women should bear children between IS and 30, men between about 37 and 50.
And the reason why men should s ta rt begetting at about th a t age is so that
the next generation will be ready to take over when father is ready to retire
<Politics VII 16, 1335ai2-27). The point is th at in an independent household one
of the partners must be mature, and it can hardly be the woman,*?
We may still feel like asking, however, why nature fixes things this way.
It is not too hard to imagine a. world in which women s ta rt bearing children
at age 35, recruiting young studs to do the outside work under their wise
direction. Aristotle has no explanation to offer of why the world should not be
like that. In a way, he needs none; if the best medical opinion says th at a certain
age span proves bast for bearing and begetting, that is that. Culture does not .
defy nature, but is itself natural. But, since the facts might have been otherwise,
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Aristotle’s system calls, for a teleological explanation; and the explanation,
though he does not offer it, might well be that the mature partner is the male
because the male, on account of the busy and assertive character with which
his chemistry endows him, is ήγβμονχκωτβρον·^·® It is in ju st such ways th a t
Aristotle’s closely-argued and well-integrated views of sex relations may be seen
as a tissue of mutually supporting prejudices.
A real problem in Aristotle’s treatment, comparable to .the lacunae left by
his failure to look beyond two generations, is: what happens to widows? Clearly,
those young wives are going to outlive their husbands; and they will then be
mature, in no need of guidance, and such th at their deliberative faculty need
not be ακυρσν, As it happens, Aristotle does have something to say about them,
though within the conventions of Athenian law. ri e saw that according to EN
VIII.a domestic economy is-"oligarchic” and misrun if the husband interferes
in the running of the household or if the woman makes all the decisions. This
last, Aristotle says, is what happens with heiresses (βτηκ^ηροτ, Ü6ia2). These
"heiresses” are not, as today’s reader easily supposes, marriageable daughters
of the rich and powerful, the Barbara $oolworth type. Under Athenian law, a
widow must remarry because the law forbids her to handle property. But the
new husband does not control his wife’s estate. She is trustee for her firs t
husband’s children, and can sue her husband for mishandling the estate. She thus
has tremendous leverage over her husband, and obviously may taka the lead in
the family: she is, after all, not an inexperienced child. This is the sort of heiress
Aristotle has in mind. And we note the asymmetry of Aristotle’s language: an
oligarchic husband wrongly intrudes in the-wife’s domain, an oligarchic wife
wrongly assumes power in the family as a whole. That is, though husband and
wife have separate spheres of interest, it is taken for granted that the wife’s
sphere is part of the husband’s and is delegated to her by him. ούκ αγαθή
TrohuKoxpovíri, as Aristotle says at the end of äetaph$sicsK
It is not the case, then, that Aristotle thinks of women as primarily childbearers. The chemical differences between male and female are necessitated by
their different reproductive functions, the anatomical differences arise from
those functions, and the innate tendencies to temperamental differences arise
from both; but the practical differentiation of husband’s and wife’s roles depends
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on the division of choras in the homestead, and on the fact that someone has
to stay around. The relevant stereotype of the family farm is one still familiar.
I have already mentioned th a t Aristotle’s objection to Plato’s use of animal
analogues in his advocacy of the abolition of sax roles in the Republic is that
it ignores the human institution of household organization, οικονομίαν We may
now add to th a t his explicit statement th a t equality of sexes would not work
on the farm, because "Who will see to the house while the men are seeing to
the business of. the fields?” (i264b 2-3, Barker trans.) In relation to Plato, of
course, this is merely stupid, an amusing or exasperating peiitio·, but we note
once more th a t Aristotle’s appeal is to a natural separation of functions, net
to any supposed intellectual or emotional incapacity of women to take executive
roles.
The differentiation of sex roles belongs to the context of the homestead,
the οίκία. But man is by nature a political animal: the possibilities of human
life are fulfilled only in the city. What comes of sax differentiation in the city?
Aristotle fails disastrously to come to grips with this question. A city is
originally a union of households; and in such a union it seams obvious that it
should be the outside workers, the males, who get together. But in the city as
such it is (as it were) only these outside relations that matter. The male acquires
a new role. The female plays no part in the city as such: women are not, or
should not be, citizens, because they are restricted to the homestead and do
not contribute to the life of the city as such. Besides, a city is more than a
union of homesteads: it is centred on a town, and landowners increasingly live
in town. And, in the town, neither the internal nor the external chares of the
homestead remain. The town context replaces the man’s life with the richer life
adumbrated in the Ethics·, but what sort of life does a Greek town provide for
the wife? Aristotle says nothing at all, anywhere, about the lives of women
otherwise than in the homestead context; he ignores what is surely the fact,
th a t in an urban environment this context has vanished and not been replaced—
or» insofar as it does remain, has become vestigial. Aristotle is aware of the
problem, in a way. He points out that, just as husband and wife each constitute
half of an οικία»'So a city consists half of men and half of woman (Í2á9bi4),
t

and in a city th at makes no provision for the lives of woman half the citizen
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body is left οπτοαδβυτόν— a word which it would be hardly tendentious to
translate here as "unprepared for civic life” (1260bi8).^
How can Aristotle have got himself into this mess? Essentially, it is because,
although it is only in a city that human potentiality is fulfilled, no accommodation
is reached between three ways of looking at the city. From one point of view,
it is an association of homesteads; and, as such, the homestead retains its
essential "economic” function. From another point of view, it is an association
of individuals, because it exists for the sake of the quality of the lives of its
members. But from a third point of view it is an association of family units
through their decision-making members, and such units are not necessarily
homesteads. If they are not, women are left without any context in which they
have a significant role. It is this third viewpoint th a t Aristotle never
acknowledges. _
The same fuzziness pervades Aristotle’s entire view of man as a φυσεχ
ττοίητχκσν ζφον (1253a 3). We tend to translate to hoyov εχον as "reason” or
"the rational”, but of.course that is misleading: λόγος is language, as Aristotle
makes explicit at 1253a 9-13, and the function of language is to integrate the
values and purposes of people in households and in cities. The Ethics makes it
entirely clear how human life is thus self-consciously realized in a distinctively
civic setting. But when we turn to Politics III we find that the virtue of a citizen
as such is confined to the performance of public functions in relation to the
city as an organized institution—functions' which are almost necessarily confined
to a part of the free population. The vaunted union of state and society, supposed
to be summed up in the concept of the trohtç» stands revealed as pure ideology.
We have seen th a t Aristotle shows himself uneasy about the problems his
treatment involves; but his uneasiness is not sufficient to make him mend his
ways.
The social background of Aristotle’s curious blindness on the equivocal
nature of the city is explored by Μ. I. Finley in "The Greek City” (reprinted
as chapter i of Economy and Society in Ancient Greece). Ho Greek writer, he
says, makes any distinction between town and hinterland, much lass argues for
a beneficial division of labour between the two (in the manner of Adam Smith),
still less argues for a conflict of interest between them (in the manner of Marx

Francis Sparshott

Aristotle on tornen

and Engels in the German Ideology). As in Plata’s Republicx urban institutions
simply mediate between family homesteads, and are presumed to have no separata
interests. Findley points out that Strabo thinks of urban life as associated with
agricultural (as opposed to pastoral or hunting) economies.^ That is, as Aristotle
suggests at the beginning of Politics I, a n ‘agricultural society is static and
needs a permanent defence for its fields, and the city develops out of the resulting
union with its walled town. The city, th a t is, comes from the functional
interdependence of agriculture and town life; the possibility that the city might
develop further is not to be taken seriously. Greek cities have temples but no
guild halls; the town as a self-contained unit is a development of the lata middle
ages.
To conclude: sex differentiation is a pervasive and striking feature of the
animal world, of which humans form a part. Patriarchy and role differentiation
between men and women are pervasive phenomena in human societies. Aristotle
is not about to re-design the world. But these phenomena are explained and
justified at the economic level, and th a t is not where the human values lie. At
the higher level of civilized life, the differentiation becomes anomalous. Aristotle
never shows how the anomaly is to be overcome. As in the Ethics the phenomenon
of άχρκσί« arises because individuals remain victimized by the mechanisms that
kept them alive as children, so the natural development of the city is undermined
by the fact th a t half its members are disenfranchised by its economic origins.
In both cases, an optimistic teleology is undercut by an essentially tragic view
of individual and social life. The difference is th at in the Ethics the problem
is confronted and the limits to its solution sketched. In the Politics^ which of
course is not a unified work, the problem is raised but not explored. This is
partly because, the account of the homestead and the treatment of the city as
such are not made into a single whole. Like the problem of slavery, the problem
of woman’s place in the city (or rather: the place of sex differentiation among
citizens) is not treated as urgent. But, in any case, it is hard to guess just
how Aristotle’s discussions of the Politics are supposed to be related to the
social and political realities of his own place and time.
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NOTES
1.

Compare Aristotle’s ob¿action to the radical innovativeness of Plato’s sociology in
the Eapublic·. "We are hound to pay same regard to the long past and the passage
of the years, in which these things would not have gone unnoticed if they had
been really good. Almost everything has been discovered already, . {Politics
i2£4ai-4, trans. Barker).

2.

Careful attention should be paid to the wording of EN iiQ2b29-iíQ3a2. The όρβκτχκόν
is really &ιογον, though in a sense it shares in hô?oç because it is κατηκοον
and ττ8\θ«ρχ·ικόν in relation to it; but it can, for th a t reason, be called hoTnicôç
in a secondary sense. It is presumably, then, able in a way to interpret instructions,
precisely as a person does and not as a computer does.

3.

Moses Finley calls Aristotle "the most forthright exponent of the doctrine of natural
slavery, a doctrine which was combatted in his own day and generally rejected
by philosophers in later generations” {Economy and Society in Ancient Grsacef New
York, Viking Press, 1932, 123). Finley does not specify what the doctrine expounded
and combatted was. He plainly wishes us to believe th a t Aristotle taught th at
slavery, as practised, was a natural and hence defensible institution. That is not
what Aristotle taught.

4.

A ristotle’s argument is, none the less, pernicious. Once one has established that
it is right to treat in a certain way persons of a certain sort, it is always tempting
to declare th a t persons one wants to tre a t in th a t way are persons of that sort.
And it is a familiar observation th at people who have been enslaved for a while
do come to act like natural slaves.

5.

The sharpness of Aristotle’s division between planning ability and the ability to
obey intelligently obscures a lot of practical, issues. There could not literally be
a nation of natural slaves, th at is of people who were simply unable to run their
own lives at all: if they are a nation, they must be running their lives. But all
sorts of people are reluctant to accept responsibility far running their own lives,
at one level or another. A nation with an "unemployment problem” is one in which
most people do not accept responsibility for maintaining themselves in existence,
but expect th a t someone else will "give them a job” and tell them what to do with
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their lives. Are they natural slaves? And there may well have been nations, like
the Scythians, which regularly sold off certain classes of the population as slaves,
and in which the condition of slavery was accepted.
6.

Moses Finley, Economy and Society in Ancient Greece 114-115, states' that "The PreGreek world . . . was, in a very profound sense, a world without free men. . . .
It was equally a world in which chattel slavery played no role of any consequence.
. . . One aspect of Greek history, in short, is the advance* hand in hand, of freedom
and slavery.” If Finley is right, Aristotle is wrong in an illuminating way. In the
grip of the Greek preoccupation with !heu8epi<x, he ignores the. existence elsewhere
in his world of a great variety of servitudes, such th a t for any individual the
question is not whether one is in servitude or not, but to whom one is in servitude
in what respect.

7.

"Aristotle on Slaves and Women,” in Jonathan Barnes at al., ads., Articles on
Aristotle^ II, London, Duckworth, 1977,135-40.

8.

A soft spot in the present paper is that it takes insufficient account of Aristotle’s
careful terminological distinction between women’and females. In Politics 1 13, he
speaks of the virtues of women (in the context, of wives) at 1259b 30, but in the
discussion of authority at 1260a 9-14 he uses different language: Shhov yocp τρόπον
το Iheu0epov ToG óouhou αρχ,ει κοη το ccppsv toG 9nheoç κ«χ άνήρ ποηόός;. It
is the female, not the wife in which (rather than in whom!) the deliberative function
• is mcopov. But immediately afterward, in reverting to the topic of male and female
virtues, Aristotle reverts to the-word γυνή, as though the two discussions were
one and the two terms synonymous.

9.

Perhaps this formulation derives from the summary and incidental statement in
Metaphysics Θ, where Aristotle asks why the differences between the saxes do not
lead us to speak of men and women as different natural kinds. The answer is that
men and women do not differ in essence, but only in their bodies (1053b23).

■IQ. Gen. An. 729a IQ. The male provides the "formal and efficient cause”; from De Anima
we know th a t this is the "soul”, the vivifying power that enables the catamenia
to fulfil the power of developing into an animal body and living an animal life.
Aristotle thinks of semen as a foam {Gen. An. 729alC), not as a bearer of spermatozoa;
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hsncs his mistaken supposition th at the analogue of semen is the catamenia, not
the ovum—see Platt’s note to the Oxford translation of Gen. An. L 19.
11. This is followed by an even more baffling .non-answer: th a t male and female are
the «ρχοα of living things. Presumably this refers back to the argument of Physics
I, which establishes th at in every change the opxat are the same: a continuant
and a form. This in turn relies on the yet more basic principle th at change is
never self-precipitating or self-perpetuating, so that if animals can’t live for aver
animal continuity must depend on something happening—-presumably to an animal.
Since the outcome must be a new animal, presumably the event must be occasioned
by an animal. But why not by something in the same animal? Or by an animal of
ju st the same sort (a bisexual one?). Such things da occur, so th at in the end
A ristotle’s purported explanations reduce to descriptions of the ordinary course
of events.
12. · I have departed from Thompson’s Oxford translation here, which obliterates
Aristotle’s terminological differentiation between man and mala, woman and female.
The difference seems to have no function in this context, but it is striking enough
to preserve (cf. note 8 above), I have also rendered ςυοπτατητας in the passive rather
than in the active sense which Thompson and LSJ prefer here.
13. I take it th a t the statement at Rhetoric I 5, 13àia5, ôqhexwv
άρβτή σώματος
μέν KÔchhoç καί μύγεθος, ψυχής δε σωφροσύνη καί φιλεργία aveu àveheuSepiaç,
represents the common view of· the masculine world in which the orator operates
rather than Aristotle’s analytical view.
14. Emphasis on the distinction between getting and keeping is not peculiar to Aristotle.
We find it in Xenophon (cited below). Long before th at, on the Uruk vase, c. 3000
B.C., the bridegroom Amaushumgalanna, followed by a long retinue of food-bearers,
is received at the doorway by his bride Inanna, behind whom we see an array of
storage vessels. See Thorkild Jacobsen, The Treasures o f Darkness^ New Haven,
Yale University Press, 1976, 24.
15. Essentially the same point is made at EN V. 6, 1134b 7-18. There cannot be justice
in an unqualified sense between oneself and one’s child or chattel (i,e. slave) because
the la tte r are not independent persons. Justice in the city is a matter of legally
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.structured relations between people who are-subject to law and have an equal share
in ruling and being ruled. v’Hsncén (my emphasis: δχο) "justice can more truly be
manifested toward a wife than toward children and chattels» for the former is
household justice; but even this is different from political justice."
16. Γη Toronto in 1950, when I was 24 and contemplating wedlock» my landlady» a banker’s
widow from Kamloops B. C. told me th at I should wait until I was 35 and had
established a position in the world and then marry soma nice young girl. I suppose
it is just coincidence th at she hit on the same age as Xenophon for bridegrooms,
though not for brides. (Whatever may have been the case among the upper crust
in Kamloops, no such disparity in ages was regarded as the norm where Î come
from, nor, my mother-in-law assures me, in rural Ontario; though in both places
there was a strong and unargued feeling th a t the bridegroom should be a year
or two alder, and certainly no younger.)
1?. It is very curious th at Aristotle nowhere considers the structure of a threegeneration family or an extended family: the model is always the married couple
with their children and slaves. The reason for this is nowhere discussed. Perhaps
the reason is th a t given for discussing only simple forms of political constitution:
a basic city is already a complete city, and complications add nothing of significance.
If that is the reason, though, it is a very bad one.
18. In this connection, it is not inappropriate to point to the real weakness of
Aristotle’s'teleology: th at it represents an ill-integrated mixture of three very
different notions. One is the notion of immediate finality involved in .his theory
of generation and of. change generally: th at in natural processes the final and
the formal causes are the same. The second is the general thesis that natural change
has as its general end the simulation of the unchanging activity of an eternal
unmoved mover. The third is the hierarchy of ends and integration of functions
in the natural world as a whole, so th at the placing of a shark’s teeth partly
serves the purpose of allowing some of its prey to escape— an integration that
is strongly implied at the and of ¿Isiaphgsics Λ. Aristotle is conscious of the
ambiguity of teleological explanatons as between intentions fulfilled and functions
performed; but he is less steadily aware of the difference between the three sorts
of explanation distinguished here, so th at when he says Icosely that something
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"is better so” one sometimes does not know at all what he has in mind.
19. At 1260bi3, the expression is γυναίκες ημχσυ μέρος των ελευθερίων, for after
all women are not (as we saw) strictly citizens; but in the discussion of Sparta,
at 12ó9bi3, women are said to be ημισυ της ττόλεως,
20; Findley cites Strabo 4. 1. 5 and invokes other unspecified passages. But all one
finds at 4. L 5 is a reference to the Massiliotes as άντϊ του ττοΛεμεΐυ τετριμμένων
ηδη ττρός ιτοιΜτβνας καί γεωργίας, and this hardly carries the point, for Strabo
could be citing what he thinks of as two unrelated marks of stability

